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In the months leading up to the US invasion of Iraq, I did not believe,
and said so in public, that Iraq was in any way directly responsible for
9/11, or that the Iraqi regime had any substantive links with al-Qa'ida,
or that it was likely that Iraq was actually able to field weapons of mass
destruction. I believed that Iraq had probably tried to obtain weapons-
grade plutonium, and I knew that it had actually
obtained centrifuges from Germany, as well as
the means to manufacture chemical and biologi-
cal weapons from Germany and the US. I sur-
mised, from a position of total scientific igno-
rance, that Iraq probably possessed most of the
ingredients necessary to manufacture weapons
of mass destruction, but that it was some way off
from actually doing so. 
I also knew that Iraq had one of the most vicious
and unscrupulous regimes in the Middle East, if
not the world; that Saddam Husayn and his
cronies had between them murdered and impris-
oned hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens, and
that any Iraqi who could escape from Iraq (and,
given the long and largely unguarded frontiers,
this was not too difficult) would do so. There
were, in January 2003, some two million Iraqis liv-
ing in exile in other Middle Eastern countries, in
Europe, especially in and around London, and in the United States. I
knew that an essential ingredient for peace and stability in the Middle
East, apart from a just and permanent settlement of the Israeli-Pales-
tinian issue, would be the removal of this terrible regime. And finally, I
knew that, much as they might desire its removal, the people of Iraq
were not, and for the foreseeable future would not be, in a position to
remove it by themselves. And for that reason, I supported an American
invasion whose ostensible objective was to remove this vicious dicta-
torship, knowing full well, that Saddam Husayn owed his own survival
throughout the 1980s to the support of an American administration
which included such knights in shining armour as George Bush senior
and his good friends Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Perhaps I was
naïve, but I could see no other way of removing Saddam Husayn. 
However, I pretty well withdrew my general approval of the action
taken by the US to remove the regime on 9 April 2003, 21 days after the
invasion was launched, the day on which Saddam Husayn’s regime fell
apart. Every day since then has brought mounting evidence of the al-
most incredible bungling and incompetence which has attended the
American administration of the peace. It is not as if no one in the ad-
ministration had given any thought to what might happen after an
American victory—which, of course, could scarcely have been in
doubt. An article in the New York Times on October 18 reported at
length on a State Department project initiated in April 2002 involving
over 200 Iraqi lawyers, engineers and businessmen, divided into work-
ing groups ‘to study topics ranging from creating a new justice system
to reorganizing the military to revamping the economy.’ Surprise, sur-
prise, the Pentagon ignored most of the project’s findings, which in-
cluded, for example, a much more dire assessment of the dilapidation
of the country’s water and electricity supplies than the Pentagon as-
sumed. It’s also fascinating that the working groups predicted that a
fair amount of looting would take place. It is regrettable, to say the
least, that some of the project’s cautionary findings were not acted
upon much sooner. It will be fascinating for future historians to try to
work out ‘what went wrong’; tawdry turf wars between the State De-
partment and the Pentagon are presumably at the root of much of the
mess. 
It is not entirely clear how or why the situation unravelled so quickly,
but here are some general pointers. In the first place, the invasion it-
self lacked the broad legitimacy which a UN mandate would have
conferred upon it. Undoubtedly, the reason why the invasion took
place when it did was a general sense, on the part of the US adminis-
tration, that the large body of troops which it had transported to the
region could not be kept in place there indefinitely. The Bush admin-
istration seems to have simply ignored the importance of taking the
international community along with it, as it has discovered at its ex-
pense. 
In the immediate aftermath of the attack on Iraq, when no weapons
of mass destruction were found and went on being not found, it was
argued that as Iraq was the size of California, it was not all that sur-
prising that US troops could not find anything—they could not
search every nook and cranny over such a wide area. At the same
time, Rumsfeld and the US regional and field commanders, to this
day, assert that there are ample numbers of troops in Iraq. One can-
not have it both ways; if there are not enough troops to find the
weapons of mass destruction, then there are not enough to stabilize
or pacify the country, period. And then there were the issues of elec-
tricity and water. Obviously, the infrastructure had been in a mess
since the Iran-Iraq war, but it nonetheless seemed almost incredible
to many Iraqis that things took so long to be put right, in spite of sab-
otage and the difficulty of getting large electric generators into
place. 
Every day we hear on the news that another US soldier, another
group of Iraqi civilians, has been killed by forces still loyal to Saddam
Husayn, or by terrorists who have infiltrated the ‘porous’ borders. Al-
most all these attacks take place in a relatively small area, the Sunni
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rectangle (rather than triangle) bounded by Baghdad, Takrit and Fal-
luja, and al-Anba’, the provinces of Diyala and Dulaym. This was and
remains the heartland of support for the regime. Although Sunni
Arabs only form between 15 and 20 per cent of the population of
Iraq, they have nonetheless ruled the state since its foundation under
British auspices after the First World War. Under any future regime, it
is almost inconceivable that they will continue to do so. This particu-
lar form of resistance is probably not the expression of an especially
widespread sense of outrage at US occupation, although the inability
of the US to maintain order, and get adequate water and electricity
up and running again, means that the
US is not quite as welcome as it
thought itself entitled to be. This re-
sistance is a kind of last stand, an ef-
fort on the part of a fairly small group
of desperadoes who have no future in
a reconstituted Iraq and who feel that
they have nothing to lose. Obviously,
those behind such incidents are Sun-
nis, because there are no Shi'is in that
part of Iraq. But this is very far from
being a ‘religious resistance’, al-
though there are undoubtedly some
salafis, or Sunni fundamentalists, among
the resisters. More pertinently, Saddam
Husayn and his circle came from Takrit,
and were all Sunnis. But what is much
more important than the fact that they
were members of the same religious
sect is that they were all from the same
area, had gone to school with each
other, knew each others’ relatives, and
so on. So, to speak of ‘Sunni opposition’
is both misleading and disingenuous.
The US administration has made a
large number of serious mistakes. In
the first place, as I have already im-
plied, not enough troops were in-
volved in the conquest of the coun-
try—or at least, not enough to ensure
stability and security after the battle
for control had been won. Neither the
Iraqi army nor the Republican Guard
was properly disarmed, which is why
members of both groups have weapons which they are turning against
US soldiers. In mid-November, it was reported that American troops
killed three Iraqi civilians at an arms market ; that such an institution
could operate freely under present circumstances suggests an extraor-
dinary lack of perception on the part of the US. 
Perhaps the US civil administration’s greatest weakness is its apparent
lack of sense of direction, and what seems to be the lack of any real ex-
pertise among the expatriates who are being employed. For example, I
have read several reports on the general topic of ‘what should be done’;
none of the authors are either country or regional experts. They are
worthy people who have worked at putting Bosnia back together again,
or in regenerating Kosovo, but they have not had any substantial Mid-
dle Eastern experience. 
The repressive situation within Iraq over the last thirty years made it
impossible to develop a viable opposition to the regime, which meant
that opposition forces and groupings had to come together in exile.
The US, perforce, relied—far too much, in my opinion—on those who
told it what it wanted to hear. Ahmad Chalabi, who had and still has al-
most no name recognition, let alone popular following, in Iraq, appar-
ently encouraged the US to believe that its soldiers would be ‘garland-
ed with flowers’ wherever they went. Chalabi, incidentally, was con-
victed of embezzling $300 million from a Jordanian Bank in the late
1970s. He alleges that he was framed by the Jordanian government
acting under pressure from Baghdad, but whatever the extent of Chal-
abi’s actual dishonesty, his apparent lack of judgement should surely
disqualify his candidature for the leadership of Iraq, a project seeming-
ly high on the agenda of the US government and that of Professor
Bernard Lewis. The 84 year old Lewis, whose views are often taken
quite seriously in Washington, went on record recently as advocating
the restoration of the Iraqi monarchy. 
In July, the US created the 25 member Iraqi Governing Council, sup-
posedly the first step towards Iraqis taking over control of their coun-
try themselves. While it is not intended to be a democratic body, the
IGC is supposed to prepare the country for the transition to self-gov-
ernment. Unfortunately its functions are rather hampered by the fail-
ure, on the part of the CPA and the US’
proconsul Mr Bremer, to give even the
vaguest indication of a time frame for
this handover. As I said, I do not think
this handover should take place, for
some time, at least as long as the secu-
rity situation remains as uncertain as it
is. To hand over full responsibility for
security to the Iraqis with any speed
would most likely result in a version of
the kind of war-lordism we are familiar
with from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it
would be wise to give some indication
of the general direction the US envis-
ages things will be moving in, a road
map, to use a term devalued from an-
other Middle Eastern context.
Of course, in an ideal world, one coun-
try would not send an army of occupa-
tion to another, nor would it seek to
compensate for its military expendi-
ture by awarding a number of lucrative
post-war and reconstruction contracts
to its own nationals, in processes
which are obviously far from transpar-
ent, to say the least. I am highly critical
of the incompetence and sheer stupid-
ity of US policy in Iraq. But willing the
US not to be there in the first place is to
deny reality, however uncomfortable
we may be with this. I do not know
whether, in the long term, the US will
succeed in what it claims to wish to
achieve, that is, bringing democracy to
the Middle East. Of course this laudable objective would also signal the
end, or the very great modification, of the present regimes in Egypt
and Jordan, not to mention those in Saudi Arabia and Syria, or Iran—al-
though there the people may, very painfully, manage that on their
own. Arab regimes are almost universally execrated by those who are
unfortunate enough to live under them, and they are often still in exis-
tence because of the support which they receive from the United
States. On the other hand, the construction, or the encouragement, of
democracy is not an unworthy aim. The main problem, in Iraq at the
moment, is getting it right, and I am not sure how long either the
American people or the more long-suffering people of Iraq can put up
with the United States’ seemingly unending capacity to get it wrong. 
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